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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Thomas Edward Boyce appeals from the district court's order revoking his 
probation and executing a reduced unified sentence of eight years, with three 
years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to grand theft. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While on probation for grand theft, Boyce stole $2,700 from his employer 
to pay off a gambling debt. (PSI, pp.2, 9, 17, 22-23, 33. 1) The state charged 
Boyce with grand theft (R., pp.21-22), and Boyce pied guilty (R., pp.26-28). The 
district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with three years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.34-38.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, 
the district court suspended Boyce's sentence and placed him on probation for 
10 years. (R., pp.43-50.) 
On June 7, 2010, Boyce's employer filed a police report "for the theft of 
$1000.00." (PSI, pp.118-19, 124.) Boyce's probation officer and other law 
enforcement officials attempted to locate Boyce but were unsuccessful. (PSI, 
pp.118-19, 124.) When questioned, Boyce's family members advised Boyce's 
probation officer that they had not seen Boyce "since before June 7, 201 O." 
(PSI, pp.118-19, 124.) 
On July 1, 2010, the state filed a motion alleging that Boyce had violated 
the terms and conditions of his probation by changing residences without 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"BoycePSl.pdf." 
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, absconding supervision of $1,000 from 
his (R., pp.51-53; see PSI, pp.11 (6/22/10 Report of 
Violation and attachments).) The state subsequently dismissed the theft 
allegation (R., p.75; 11/10/10 Tr., p.5, Ls.12-16) but, after an evidentiary hearing, 
the district court found Boyce had violated his probation by changing residences 
without permission and absconding supervision (R., pp.75-76; 11/10/10 Tr., p.25, 
L.4 - p.27, L.2). The court revoked Boyce's probation and ordered executed a 
reduced unified sentence of eight years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.79-83; 
1/19/11 Tr., p.8, L.20 - p.9, L.1.) Boyce filed a notice of appeal, timely only from 
the district court's January 24, 2011 order revoking his probation. (R., pp.84-87.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Boyce states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Boyce due process 
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment 
with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Boyce's probation? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Boyce failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record with irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Has Boyce failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation after Boyce changed residences without permission 
and absconded supervision? 
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I. 
Boyce Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His 
Constitutional Rlghts By Denying His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record 
With Irrelevant Transcripts 
A Introduction 
After the appellate record was settled, Boyce filed a motion to augment 
with as-yet unprepared transcripts of his November 18, 2002 change of plea 
hearing, his December 12, 2002 sentencing hearing, and his June 10, 2003 
jurisdictional review hearing. (Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing 
Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof, filed November 14, 2011.) The 
Idaho Supreme Court denied the motion and ordered Boyce to file his 
Appellant's brief. (Order Denying Motion To Augment And To Suspend The 
Briefing Schedule, filed December 9, 2011.) 
Boyce now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record with the requested transcripts, 2 the Idaho Supreme Court has violated his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has effectively 
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-
14.) Boyce has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights, however, 
2 Boyce states in his Appellant's brief that, in addition to challenging the denial of 
his request for augmentation of the appellate record with the November 2002 
change of plea hearing, the December 2002 sentencing hearing and the June 
2003 jurisdictional review hearing, he is also "challenging the Idaho Supreme 
Court's denial of his request for transcripts of the ... Admit/Deny hearing held on 
April 19, 2010, and the disposition hearing held on August 2, 2010." (Appellant's 
) The state notes that Boyce never requested transcripts of hearings 
held on April 19 or August 2, 2010, nor does it appear from the record or the 
register of actions that any such hearings ever took place in this case. 
~~ R.) 
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because he has failed to show that the requested transcripts (of hearings held 
between seven and eight years before the district court revoked Boyce's 
probation in January 2011) are even relevant to, much less necessary for 
resolution of, the only issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P .3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
C. Boyce Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The 
Requested Augmentations 
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is 
sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the 
proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 
(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and 
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, 
however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide 
transcripts or other items that "will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 
n.5 (1996) ("an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial 
record that are germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations 
5 
omitted)}; U 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. 
record is not sufficient, the defendant must show 
that the 
from the 
record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 
620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 
148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 
(1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice Boyce "must present something more than 
gross speculation that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. 
Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002). Boyce has failed to carry this burden. 
Boyce's appeal is timely only from the district court's January 24, 2011 
order revoking his probation and executing a reduced sentence. (See R., p.81 
(order revoking probation filed January 24, 2011 ), p.84 (notice of appeal filed 
February 28, 2011).) He argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due 
process and equal protection by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record with as-yet unprepared transcripts of his November 2002 change of plea 
hearing, his December 2002 sentencing hearing and his June 2003 jurisdictional 
review hearing (Appellant's brief, pp.5-14), but he has failed to explain, much 
less demonstrate, how transcripts of hearings held approximately eight years 
before the decision at issue in this case are necessary to decide the only issues 
over which this Court has jurisdiction on this appeal. There is no evidence that 
the district court had such transcripts when it revoked Boyce's probation in 
January 2011, or that it relied upon anything said at the previous hearings as a 
basis for decision to revoke Boyce's probation and order executed a reduced 
sentence. In fact, the district court specifically stated at the outset of the 
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probation violation disposition hearing that it had reviewed the presentence 
report and the May 2003 report from NICI (12/8/10 Tr., p.4, Ls.8-18), but it said 
nothing about having reviewed or relied on the transcripts to which Boyce now 
claims he is entitled, nor could it have because those transcripts have never 
been prepared. Because the as-yet unprepared transcripts were never 
presented to the district court in relation to the probation revocation proceedings, 
they were never part of the record before the district court in considering whether 
to revoke Boyce's probation and are not properly considered for the first time on 
appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374,376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972,974 n.1 
(Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a decision on the issues raised on appeal, the 
appellate court is "limited to review of the record made below" and "will not 
consider new evidence that was never before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. 
Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of 
this Court to entertain new allegations of fact and consider new evidence."). In 
short, Boyce has failed to show how the requested transcripts are relevant to any 
issue arising from revocation of probation and the execution of his sentence, the 
only issues over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. 
The state recognizes the Court of Appeals' statement in State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), relied on by Boyce 
(Appellant's brief, p.11 ), that appellate "review [of] a sentence that is ordered into 
execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing when 
the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation." There are, however, two reasons 
7 
why Hanington does not support Boyce's claim of entitlement the requested 
transcripts. First, Boyce does not challenge the sentence that was ordered into 
execution following his period of probation but argues only that the district court 
abused its discretion in revoking his probation (see Appellant's brief, pp.14-17), a 
decision that is capable of appellate review without resort to information bearing 
on the reasonableness of the sentence that was ultimately ordered into 
execution. Second, and more importantly, Hanington does not stand for the 
proposition that a merits-based review of a decision to revoke probation and 
order a sentence executed requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate 
record of transcripts of every hearing over which the trial court presided. To the 
contrary, the law is well established that, absent a showing that evidence was 
presented at prior hearings, and/or that the district court relied on such evidence 
in reaching its decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to 
transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted before the date 
probation was finally revoked. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 
(1971) (state is not "required to expend its funds unnecessarily" where "part or all 
of the stenographic transcript . . . will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal" (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 
("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by 
unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcripts does not mean that the 
State must waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate 
appellate review."); see also Strand, 137 Idaho at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78 
(indigent appellant challenging denial of Rule 35 motion not entitled to 
8 
transcription at public expense of Rule 35 hearing at which no evidence was 
presented). 
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the 
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review the revocation of 
probation, Boyce has failed to show that any such circumstances apply here. 
Boyce has failed to point to anything in the record that would indicate that what 
happened at the 2002 and 2003 guilty plea, sentencing and jurisdictional review 
hearings was considered or played any role in the court's decision in January 
2011 to revoke Boyce's probation and order execution of a reduced sentence. 
As such, Boyce has failed to show that such transcripts are necessary to 
complete an adequate record on this appeal. 
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), Boyce claims that 
he is only required to make a "colorable argument" that he needs an "item" or 
"items" to complete a record before the burden transfers to the state "to prove 
that the requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's brief, 
p.10.) He also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the 
constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must 
provide him (and all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record he 
desires unless the state proves that "some or all of the requested materials are 
unnecessary or frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p. 7; also p.5 ("The only way a 
court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested 
transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.").) 
No reading of Mayer supports these legal arguments. 
g 
Mayer was convicted on non-feiony charges punishable only by a fine 
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct. & at 190. The appellate court denied his request for 
a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that 
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government 
expense only for felonies. & at 191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was 
entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim 
transcript of his trial. & at 193. The Court noted it had addressed a similar 
issue in Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), where the Court held that 
the government need not provide transcripts that were not "'germane to 
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds 
unnecessarily in such circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 
372 U.S. at 495-96). However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record 
where that is necessary to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would 
be available to the defendant with resources to pay his own way." 19..: at 195. 
"Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable 
need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a 
portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on 
those grounds." & 
Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must 
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal. & at 
194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is 
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant 
10 
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some 
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate. 1.9.:. at 194-95. See also 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) {in deciding whether 
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to 
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a 
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may 
take notice of the importance of a transcript). 
Here the proceeding challenged on appeal is the revocation of Boyce's 
probation in January 2011. The record related to the district court's decision to 
revoke Boyce's probation and order execution of a reduced sentence is already 
complete because all of the evidence considered by the district court is before 
the appellate court. (See,~. PSI, pp.1-10 (12/12/02 PSI), pp.108-17 (5/13/03 
APSI), pp.118-24 (6/22/1 0 Report of Violation), pp.126-33 (letters submitted to 
district court in connection with probation violation disposition); 11/10/1 0 Tr. 
(evidentiary hearing on probation violation allegations); 12/8/1 0 Tr. (first 
probation violation disposition); 1/19/11 Tr. (continued disposition hearing).) It is 
Boyce's appellate burden to establish that the requested transcripts are 
necessary to create an adequate appellate record to review the order revoking 
his probation. The augmentations he sought, however, were of never before 
prepared transcripts of hearings held between seven and eight years before the 
district court rendered the decision that is at issue in this case. Nothing in the 
record even suggests that the requested transcripts (or anything contained 
therein) were before the district court in relation to the probation revocation 
11 
proceedings. Because 
colorable need for 
make a showing of germaneness and 
transcripts, there :s no burden on the state. 
Because all of the evidence before the district court is in the appellate record, 
that record is adequate for appellate review, and Boyce has failed to establish a 
violation of his due process rights. 3 Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. 
Boyce has also failed to establish that denial of his request to augment 
the record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied him equal protection. 
Boyce cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate 
records because of their indigence. (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-12 (citing, ~. 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 
(1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the 
record that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Boyce's 
request for transcripts solely because he is indigent. In fact, Boyce's motion 
would have properly been denied even if he had the funds to pay for the 
transcripts. The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking augmentation 
to set forth a ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested. I.A.R. 30. 
Boyce's motion to augment failed because he failed to meet this minimal burden, 
imposed upon all parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or even 
3 As a component of his due process claim, Boyce argues that the denial of his 
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-14.) 
Because, for the reasons already explained, Boyce has failed to show that the 
requested transcripts are necessary, or even relevant, for appellate review of the 
district court's order revoking his probation, there is no possibility that the denial 
of the motion to augment has deprived Boyce of effective assistance of counsel 
on this appeal. 
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helpful in addressing appellate issues. The Idaho Supreme Court's order 
properly denied the motion to augment because Boyce failed to make a showing 
that any appellant - indigent or otherwise - would be entitled to augment the 
record as requested. There is no reason to believe that the motion to augment 
would have been granted had Boyce been paying for the requested transcripts; 
the rule applies to all parties, not just the indigent. 
Boyce has failed to show that the denial of his motion to augment was in 
any way influenced or decided by his indigence, nor has he demonstrated that 
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review 
any issue over which this Court has jurisdiction on appeal. To the contrary, the 
record amply demonstrates that Boyce's motion to augment was properly denied 
because he failed to show that the transcripts he requested were necessary for 
adequate review of the district court's decision to revoke Boyce's probation and 
order execution of a reduced sentence. Because Boyce has failed to show his 
due process and equal protection rights were implicated, much less violated, by 
the denial of his motion to augment, he has failed to show any basis for relief. 
II . 
Boyce Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
After finding that Boyce violated his probation by absconding supervision 
and changing residences without permission, the district court revoked Boyce's 
probation and ordered execution of a reduced sentence. (R., pp.81-83.) On 
appeal, "Boyce concedes that he violated the terms of his probation." 
13 
(Appeliant's 
discretion 
15.) He argues, however, that abused its 
revoking his probation because he "successfully completed seven 
years of probation without any probation violation allegations" (Id., p. 16) and 
because, he contends, the violations that led to his probation revocation were not 
willful and were "relatively benign," merely "technical," and "very innocuous" (Id., 
pp.16-17). None of Boyce's arguments establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. 
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378,381,870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
C. Boyce Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Revoking His Probation 
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. 
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct App. 1988). In determining 
whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is 
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of 
society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); 
Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 
717. "If a knowing and intentional probation violation has proved, a district 
court's to revoke probation will be an abuse of discretion." 
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State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 3d 33, 36 (2009) (quoting State v. 
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P .3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001 )). If, however, the 
violation "was not willful, or was beyond the probationer's control, a court may 
not revoke probation and order imprisonment without first considering alternative 
methods to address the violation." kl Contrary to Boyce's assertions on appeal, 
a review of the record and the applicable law supports both the district court's 
implicit determination that Boyce's violations were willful and its decision, after 
considering alternatives to incarceration, to revoke Boyce's probation because it 
was no longer achieving the goal of rehabilitation or consistent with the 
protection of society. 
When considering whether a probation violation was willful, the Court of 
Appeals has consistently reviewed the record to determine whether substantial 
evidence exists to show a willful violation. ~, State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 
918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003); Leach, 135 Idaho at 530-31, 20 
P.3d at 714-15; State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. 
App. 1994). Thus, when a district court finds that a defendant has violated his 
probation, unless the district court explicitly states otherwise, the presumption is 
that the violation was willful. See State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 844 P.2d 31 
(Ct. App. 1992) (noting the district court "implicitly determined that Peterson's 
disregard of the reporting obligation was willful"). 
In finding Boyce in violation of his probation by having absconded 
supervision and changing residences without permission, the district court did 
not explicitly articulate whether it deemed the violations willful; however, there is 
15 
substantial evidence in the record establishing that they were. Boyce's probation 
officer, Shantel Duerksen, testified that Boyce resided in Nevada and was 
supervised pursuant to an interstate compact. (11/10/10 Tr., p.7, L.15 - p.8, 
L.1.) In June 2010, Officer Duerksen received a report of violation from the 
Nevada Department of Correction indicating that Boyce's supervising officer in 
Nevada and the local sheriff's department had both made numerous attempts to 
contact Boyce but were unable to locate him for approximately one month. 
(11/10/10 Tr., p.8, L.17 - p.9, L.12, p.12, Ls.3-10.) Officer Duerksen testified 
that, when interviewed by the Nevada Department of Correction, Boyce "stated 
that he went camping for three weeks and while he was camping his family 
moved him out." (11/10/10 Tr., p.9, Ls.13-19.) 
Boyce also testified at the evidentiary hearing and admitted that he was 
"gone from [his] residence from June 7 when the officer was trying find [him]" 
and did not return until July 7, at which time he moved into a new residence that 
he had not yet reported to his supervising officer. (11/10/10 Tr., p.18, L.24 -
p.19, L.14.) Boyce testified that he told his supervising officer that he "was going 
to go camping, and [the officer] said that would be fine." (11/10/10 Tr., p.19, 
L.25 - p.20, L.1.) Boyce admitted, however, that he never told the officer exactly 
when or where he planned to go camping, or how long he would be gone. 
(11/10/10 Tr., p.19, L.15 - p.20, L.3, p.22, L.25 - p.23, L.3.) He also admitted 
that he "knew [he] couldn't just take off without letting [his] PO know." (11/10/10 
Tr., p.20, Ls.4-6.) Finally, he testified that, while he was camping, his mother 
and a friend moved his belongings to the friend's house. (11/10/10 Tr., p.17, 
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Ls.10-12.) Boyce moved into the friend's residence upon returning from his 
camping trip, but he did not report the change of address to his supervising 
officer until the next day. (11/10/10 Tr., p.19, Ls.3-14.) 
The above evidence, including Boyce's own testimony, constitutes 
substantial evidence showing that Boyce's probation violations were willful. 
Boyce may have told his probation officer that he was going camping, but he 
failed to tell the officer when, where and for how long, thus effectively thwarting 
any attempts by the officer to supervise him during his absence. The record thus 
supports the district court's implicit finding that Boyce's act of absconding 
supervision was willful. 
The record also supports the district court's implicit determination that 
Boyce's failure to obtain written permission from his supervising officer before 
changing residences was willful. As found by the district court, Boyce "may have 
been moved out. But he should have immediately submitted a written request to 
change residences. And that was not done." (11/10/10 Tr., p.26, Ls.23-25.) 
Instead, the evidence shows that Boyce moved into the residence upon returning 
from his three and half week camping trip and did not report the new address to 
his probation officer until the next day. That Boyce testified he had changed 
residences before without first seeking the permission of his probation officer 
(see 11/10/10 Tr., p.17, L.21 - p.18, L.1) does not show a lack of willfulness as 
to the probation violation in this case. Boyce specifically agreed as a condition of 
his probation that he would "not change residence without first obtaining written 
permission from [his] supervising officer." (Community Corrections Division 
17 
Agreement Of Supervision, ,-r2 (Augmentation).) The record shows that, while 
Boyce's family and friends may have moved his belongings, Boyce failed to seek 
written permission for the move at the first known opportunity he was given. 
Even if this Court determines that one or both of Boyce's probation 
violations were not willful, this does not compel the conclusion that the district 
court erred in revoking Boyce's probation. Where a probation violation is not 
willful, the district court may still revoke probation if it "determines that 
alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet 
the state's legitimate interest in punishment, deterrence, or the protection of 
society." Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106, 233 P.3d at 37 (quoting Leach, 135 Idaho 
at 529, 20 P.3d at 713). In this case, the court considered alternatives to 
imprisonment and concluded they were not adequate to meet the objectives of 
sentencing. Specifically, the court considered continuing Boyce on probation if 
he could find stable employment and housing in a "structured environment" that 
would both foster his rehabilitation and protect society from his demonstrated 
propensity to steal money from his employers. (12/8/10 Tr., p.10, L.7 - p.13, 
L.3.) The court continued the disposition hearing for over a month to give Boyce 
the opportunity to "put together a really solid place to stay, and some opportunity 
at local employment, even if it's minimum wage." (12/8/10 Tr., p.13, Ls.4-22.) 
During that month, Boyce requested and received an invitation to reside at the 
Boise Rescue Mission River of Life shelter, but with no detailed plan for any kind 
of structure or programming. (PSI, p.128.) He also failed to secure any 
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guaranteed employment. (1/19/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-20 (defense counsel 
representing that Boyce "called Labor Ready and has signed up with them").) 
At the continued disposition hearing, both the state and the court 
expressed skepticism about Boyce's continued amenability to community 
supervision in light of his failure to secure employment and structured housing. 
Specifically, the state argued: 
Well, our recommendation, Judge, based on the [Boise Rescue 
Mission letter] and his simple signing up for Labor Ready is not 
change. We still feel imposition of the sentence is appropriate. 
He's done a rider in this case. He was living in Nevada. 
Apparently not doing much productive and then committed the 
violations he was found to have committed. He can't go back to 
Nevada. Doesn't have any real connection here to the area. And 
his only plan for a residence is to move into the Mission for a while. 
But he does haven't [sic] much potential for long-term success. 
He's still a threat to [the] community and we ask that you impose 
the sentence. 
(1 /19/11 Tr., p.5, L.20 - p.6, L.B.) The district court agreed with the state's 
assessment and revoked Boyce's probation, explaining: 
Well, Mr. Boyce, when the Court had originally retained 
jurisdiction in your case back in 2003, it had been the Court's hope 
that you would move on and succeed with probation. And, frankly, 
what's been demonstrated here from your record is that you 
haven't accepted the responsibilities of probation. And one of the 
primary things the Court has to look at is whether or not the Court 
has a belief that the person can comply with the terms and 
conditions of probation, otherwise we make a mockery of 
probation. 
And I know you tried your best here, but - and sometimes 
the Mission will put together a lengthy program or up to a year. In 
this case, obviously, they invited you into the Mission and they talk 
about the River of Life shelter. Frankly, it's not the level of 
structure. And I realize you're incarcerated. It's tough to get a job 
whether you're incarcerated or not, but I just still at this point do not 
have an abiding belief that you can comply with probation. 
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(1/19/11 Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.8, L.19.) 
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The district court's determination that alternatives to incarceration were 
not feasible is also supported by other information known to the court at the time 
it revoked Boyce's probation, including Boyce's criminal history and his 
performance on probation. Boyce's conviction in this case marked his second 
conviction for grand theft and his third conviction for a theft offense, generally. 
(PSI, pp.2-3.) Boyce committed his first grand theft when he stole almost $9,000 
from a Jack-In-The-Box where he worked as a shift leader. (PSI, pp.90-91.) In 
connection with his sentencing in that case, Boyce assured the court that "it will 
never happen again." (PSI, p.91.) He was given a withheld judgment and was 
placed on probation, which he subsequently violated by failing to pay restitution, 
failing to maintain employment, failing to report to his supervising officer and 
failing to obtain permission from his supervising officer before leaving his 
assigned district. (PSI, pp.2, 4, 56.) The district court reinstated him on 
probation and ordered him to serve 90 days in jail. (PSI, pp.2, 4.) Less than one 
year later, while he was still on probation for his first grand theft conviction, 
Boyce committed the offense in this case by stealing approximately $2,700 from 
the Burger King where he was employed. (PSI, pp.2, 9, 17, 22-23, 33.) 
Following a period of retained jurisdiction, the court placed Boyce on 
probation in June 2003. (R., pp.45-50.) While it is true, as Boyce contends on 
appeal, that he thereafter "completed seven years of probation without any 
probation violation allegations" (Appellant's brief, p.16 (emphasis added)), it 
appears from the record that Boyce was not as successful on probation as he 
now purports to have been. 
At the evidentiary hearing on the probation violation allegations at issue in 
this case, Boyce testified that he had "been in full compliance with probation 
since 2003." (11/10/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.16-18.) On cross-examination, however, 
Boyce admitted that he had been arrested on two separate occasions during his 
probationary period, once in July 2009 for violating a protective order and 
resisting and obstructing an officer, and once in August 2009 for "probation 
violation, assault with a deadly weapon, [and] domestic battery." (11/10/10 Tr., 
p.20, L.7 - p.21, L.21, L.15.) The charges in both cases were ultimately 
dismissed (11/10/10 Tr., p.20, Ls.13-14, p.21, Ls.11-12) but, less than a year 
later, the state filed the probation violation allegations that led to the revocation 
of Boyce's probation in this case (R., pp.51-53; PSI, pp.118-24). Included in the 
report of violation was an allegation that Boyce's employer had reported to 
Nevada police that Boyce stole $1,000. (R., p.52; PSI, p.119.) The state 
subsequently withdrew that allegation, not because of a lack of any proof as 
suggested by Boyce on appeal (Appellant's brief, p.2), but because there was no 
direct proof that Boyce was the person who stole the money (see 11/10/10 Tr., 
p.6, Ls.12-15 (state withdrawing allegation because Nevada authorities declined 
prosecution); 12/8/10 Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.10, L.6 (state explaining that Nevada 
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authorities did not pursue theft because "it was one of those situations 
where Mr. Boyce was the only one had access it, but he wasn't actually 
observed committing the theft")). Given Boyce's history of stealing from 
employers and/or allegations thereof, his arrests while on probation in this case 
and his demonstrated inability to comply with the conditions of both this and his 
prior period of probation that required him to avail himself of supervision, the 
district court acted well within its discretion in concluding that alternatives to 
revocation would not protect the public or foster Boyce's rehabilitation. 
Boyce argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in 
revoking his probation because, according to Boyce, the violations he committed 
in this case were "relatively benign," merely "technical," and "very innocuous." 
(Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.) Boyce is simply incorrect The entire purpose of 
probation is to afford the defendant "an opportunity to be rehabilitated under 
proper control and supervision." State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 860, 452 P.2d 
350, 357 (1969) (citing State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 436 P.2d 706 (1968)) 
(emphasis added). Given this premise, it is hard to imagine conditions more 
fundamental to probation than those that Boyce violated, as both conditions 
required Boyce to subject himself to supervision. 
The district court considered all of the relevant information, including 
alternatives to incarceration, and reasonably determined that Boyce was no 
longer an appropriate candidate for community supervision. Boyce has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests 
order revoking Boyce's probation. 
this Court affirm the district court's 
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